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The Road from GATT to MTO*
Gardner Patterson**
Eliza Patterson***
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GATT
A. INTRODUCTION
As an institution, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)' is a complex and untidy thing. There is not even
a consensus as to what it should be called. Is it a general agree-
ment, an executive agreement, a treaty, a cluster of treaties; or
is it an organization? While all observers agree that the first
Secretary-General was not serious when he once referred to
GATT as "a network of loopholes held together by waivers," it is
anything but neat and orderly. Some of this characteristic is in-
herent in the complex nature of its task: developing (i.e. negoti-
ating) ". . . reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements
directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers
to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment."2
Also contributing to the complexity of defining the GATT is the
fact that in international trade agreements generally, "the polit-
ical compulsion to obtain signatures upon a piece of paper often-
times was more important than the economic compulsion that
the paper should contain a basis of real understanding."3 Inher-
ent in this process is the hope that any papered-over differences,
conflicts, inconsistencies or gaps would either not become impor-
tant or could be resolved by some subsequent negotiation, regu-
lation or decision.
An important part of this institutional and legal untidiness
also results from the fact that GATT was not intended by the
* This Article was written before the completion of the Uruguay Round.
** Economist and former Deputy Director-General of GAIT.
*** Attorney, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, working on
trade issues. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5,6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
2. GATT pmbl.
3. Raymond Vernon, America's Foreign Trade Policy and the GATT, in 21
EsSAYs IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 1, 4 (1954).
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drafters to stand alone. It was seen as an interim phase-a sort
of advance installment-in the negotiation of an International
Trade Organization (ITO) which would provide the commit-
ments and institutional structure for voting, rules of procedure,
a secretariat, and detailed dispute settlement arrangements
that are a normal part of an international organization. 4 As a
result of the expectation that a formal legal arrangement was to
be concluded in the future, members accepted the obligations of
the GATT under a Protocol of Provisional Application. 5 They
thereby agreed to bind themselves only "to the fullest extent not
inconsistent with existing legislation,"6 thus avoiding the neces-
sity for a formal ratification of the agreement or for modification
of domestic legislation in conflict with it. 7
B. PRAGMATISM TAKEs OVER
The abandonment of the ITO8 left to the GATT CON-
TRACTING PARTIES (cps) the task of dealing with many legal,
institutional and constitutional matters on a pragmatic, ad hoc
basis. As it happened, this situation suited the first Secretary
General of the GATT, Eric Wyndham White, who believed that
the purpose of the GATT was to foster multilateral negotiated
reductions in trade barriers. In his opinion, this activity was not
well served by a rigorous adherence to legal norms, and sophisti-
cated economic theory provided little useful guidance to trade
negotiators. His successor, Olivier Long, a learned and thought-
ful man, was more concerned with the problems of "managing
the GATT," but he also believed that "legalism" does not contrib-
ute to trade liberalization. 9 He viewed with sympathy what he
4. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT,
chs. 1-2 (1969).
5. The Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
6. Id.
7. This "grandfather" clause was of considerable importance to the United
States because it permitted the continuing absence of an injury test in the ap-
plication of countervailing duties on subsidized imports, and permitted the
United States to maintain the discriminating features in of its coastal shipping
regulations: only U.S.-flagged vessels may carry cargo from one U.S. port to
another.
8. For an authoritative account see William Diebold, Jr., The End of the
ITO, in 16 ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (1952).
9. See OLIVIER LONG, LAw AND ITS LImITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILAT-
ERAL TRADE SYSTEM 61-64 (1987) for a detailed exposition of this view as well as
an authoritative account of how the GATT functioned in the pre-Uruguay
Round years.
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called the "evolution through tolerance," i.e. tolerance of meas-
ures not compatible with the strict application of the rules.10
Pragmatism became deeply embedded in the substantive
functioning of the GATT. In response to specific problems that
arose as time went on, the cps, occasionally borrowing from the
defunct ITO, approved a series of decisions, issued reports, cre-
ated subsidiary bodies, and developed practices and rules in con-
ducting their business that gave the GATT many of the
characteristics of an international organization. 1 This in turn
was destined to result over time in a jerry-built organizational
and legal structure and a reluctance to legally formalize the in-
stitutional framework.
In this environment, the extremely important practice of de-
cision-making by consensus developed. Although GATT Article
XXV provides that each cp is entitled to one vote at all meetings
of the cps and that each decision shall be taken by majority
vote, 12 the practice developed early whereby the cps do not pro-
ceed to a formal vote in reaching decisions, except for decisions
on waivers and accessions. Since 1959 the practice has been for
the chairman to "take the sense of the meeting." Consensus is
understood to mean that no member maintains an objection to a
text or attempts to prevent its adoption. 13
This system and these methods worked remarkably well
during the decades of the 1950s and 1960s when GATT's mem-
bership was relatively small and "like-minded." The attention of
the cps was primarily on reducing tariffs on manufactured goods
and shrinking the networks of quantitative restrictions built up
before, during and after World War II. It was a time when it
was possible to settle most disputes on an informal "fix-it" basis.
It seemed no longer to be the case, as one authoritative observer
stated in 1952, that there ". . . is a widespread opinion that
GATT should be given a firmer, clearer, juridical status." In-
deed, a rather mild effort in 1955 to create an Organization for
Trade Co-operation was not pursued.' 4 The United States was
opposed and others apparently did not feel strongly about it.1 5
10. Id. at 19.
11. Documents detailing the more important of these actions can be found
in the Basic Instruments and Selected Documents volumes (hereinafter BISD],
periodically issued by the GATT Secretariat.
12. GATT art. XXV.
13. LONG, supra note 9, at 55.
14. Id. at 12.
15. Id.
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Changes were underway, however, that would in time put
the "constitutional" issue higher on the agenda. In 1961, a Short
Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles was signed16 and has
been followed by a series of ever more encompassing textile and
clothing arrangements. 17 These arrangements were negotiated
under the aegis of the GATT and were serviced by the GATT
Secretariat. Furthermore, under these agreements, reports
were sent to the GATT Council. Yet, the agreements were in
direct contravention of the GATT articles on discrimination and
the use of quotas.' This is a classic example of GATT pragma-
tism at work and was a powerful precedent.
Other relevant changes were underway. A host of new na-
tions were acceding to the GATT. The number of cps more than
doubled in the 1960s. Most of the new members were small de-
veloping countries. They came with economic problems and na-
tional traditions vastly different from those of the earlier
members. The problem of how to "manage" the GATT took on
new dimensions.' 9
C. INsTrruTIoNAL COMPLICATIONS FROM THE ToKYo ROUND
As a consequence of the great success of the GATT in reduc-
ing tariffs and quantitative restrictions in the 1970s, the focus in
trade negotiations shifted to non-tariff barriers to trade. Faced
16. GATT', Cotton Textiles, Arrangements Regarding International Trade,
BISD 10th Supp. 18 (1962). This agreement was deemed necessary to obtain
Congressional approval for U.S. participation in the Kennedy Round.
17. See, e.g., GATT, Long Term Arrangement Regarding International
trade in Cotton Textiles, BISD 11th Supp. 25 (1963), extended by Protocols of
May 1, 1967, BISD 15th Supp. 56 (1968), and June 15, 1970, BISD 18th Supp.
18 (1972); GATTr, Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles,
BISD 21st Supp. 3 (1975), extended by Protocols of Dec. 14, 1977, BISD 24th
Supp. 5 (1978), Dec. 22, 1981, BISD 28th Supp. 3 (1982), and July 31, 1986,
BISD 33rd Supp. 7 (1987).
18. See GATT arts. I, XI, and XIII.
19. In an effort to cope with the problem of an ever-increasing number of
cps and the need "to foresee future developments in international trade rela-
tions, and to anticipate and lay the groundwork for future trade policies," the
Consultative Group of Eighteen, after much prodding by Director General
Long, was permanently established in 1975. It was only consultative in charac-
ter, however. The United States flatly rejected including the word "manage-
ment" in the title. The members were never willing to make it a real steering
committee. See LONG, supra note 9, at 50-51.
The so-called "Wise Men's Report" to the GATT proposed that a GATT Min-
isterial-level body of limited membership be established to "set the course" of
their countries' trade and economic policies and to support the multilateral
trading system. TRADE PoLcsS FOR A BETrER FuTuRE: THE 'LEUTWILER RE-
PORT', THE GATT AND THE URUGUAY RouND 56-57 (1987).
38 [Vol. 3:35
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with what were regarded as virtually insurmountable proce-
dural and substantive problems in formally amending the GATT
to accommodate the non-tariff results of the Tokyo Round, the
cps opted for a series of side "agreements," "arrangements," or
"understandings."20
Each of the Tokyo Round agreements was signed by some
but not all GATT members, raising the important question of
Most Favored Nation (MFN) rights for the non-signatories: the
"free rider" problem. Article I of the GATT (the MFN clause)
provides that any trading privilege accorded by a GATT signa-
tory must be given to all signatories. 21 The issue presented by
these new agreements was whether the benefits gained by the
new agreements extended to GATT members who did not sign
them. It was also very important that the various codes con-
tained separate and often different rules for dispute settlement.
As the nature and extent of GATT commitments proliferated,
the number of disputes was destined to grow rapidly. Inconsis-
tencies and conflicts between the GATT and the rules of the var-
ious new agreements 22 were destined to plague GATT members
in the future.
As GATT approached its fortieth anniversary, few ques-
tioned that it had been remarkably successful in its task of liber-
alizing trade. GATT had succeeded in slashing tariffs and
20. These are: GATI', Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, BISD
26th Supp. 8 (1980); GATT, Agreement on Government Procurement, BISD 26th
Supp. 33 (1980); GATT, Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles
VI, XVI and XXIII of the GATT, BISD 26th Supp. 56 (1980); GA'I', Arrange-
ment Regarding Bovine Meat, BISD 26th Supp. 84 (1980); GATT, International
Dairy Arrangement, BISD 26th Supp. 91 (1980); GATT, Agreement on Imple-
mentation of Article VII of the GATT, BISD 26th Supp. 116 (1980); GATT, Pro-
tocol to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT, BISD 26th
Supp. 151 (1980); GATT, Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, BISD 26th
Supp. 154 (1980); GATT, Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, BISD 26th
Supp. 162 (1980); GATT, Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
GATT, BISD 26th Supp. 171 (1980); Differential and More Favorable Treat-
ment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, GATT Doc.
114903 (Nov. 28, 1979XDecision) BISD 26th Supp. 203 (1980); Declaration on
Trade Measures Taken for Balance-of-Payments Purposes, GAIT Doc. 114904
(Nov. 28, 1979) BISD 26th Supp. 205; Safeguard Action for Development Pur-
poses, GATT Doc. L4897 (Nov. 28, 1979)(Decision) BISD 26th Supp. 209; Un-
derstanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, GATT Doc. L/4907 (Nov. 28, 1979) BISD 26th Supp. (1980).
21. GATT art. I.
22. JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990). Jackson
provides an authoritative account of these conflicts, duplications and inconsis-
tencies. We have benefitted in preparing this Article from discussions with Pro-
fessor Jackson, but he bears no responsibility for what is stated here.
19941
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removing a huge number of quantitative restrictions. GATT
was also successful in negotiating codes and agreements that
eliminated, reduced, or brought within international disciplines
a host of non-tariff measures adversely affecting trade. As a re-
sult, GATT deserved a great deal of credit for helping build the
prosperity that the world took for granted. Nonetheless, the
GATT system did strike many as having become "unmanageably
complex."23
II. URUGUAY ROUND MANDATE RECOGNIZES
ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS
Against this background, the cps decided at their 1986
Punta del Este Ministerial Meeting to launch the Uruguay
Round.24 The agenda covered not only all the traditional GATT
subjects - agriculture, tariffs, textiles and clothing, antidump-
ing, subsidies, and safeguards - but also included intellectual
property, services, and trade-related investment measures.
These were the so-called "new subjects."25 It was also specifi-
cally provided that the results of the Uruguay Round "shall be
treated as a single undertaking."26 In other words, participants
would accept all the results, or nothing. The Ministers recog-
nized that the task of covering all of these subjects, at a time of
rapid changes in the world economy and the great increase in
the trading importance of the developing countries, necessitated
the examination of the institutional structure of GATT. This
recognition led them to establish a negotiating group on the
"Functioning of the GATT System" (FOGS).27
The terms of reference for this group included developing
understandings and arrangements that would enable the GATT
to better monitor trade policies and practices of the cps. 2 8 This
was to be accomplished through regular monitoring, which
would allow for determination of the impact of those policies and
practices on the functioning of the multilateral trading sys-
tem.29 Another goal was to improve the quality of decisions and
23. Victoria Curzon Price, New Institutional Developments in GATT, 1
MIN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 87, 105 (1992).
24. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Sept. 20, 1986, BISD
33rd Supp. 19-28 (1987).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 20 (Part I(BXii)).
27. JACKSON, supra note 22, at 3-4.
28. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, supra note 24, at 26
(Part I(E)(i)).
29. Id.
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their overall effectiveness by involving the Ministers in GATT
decision-making. 30 In addition, the group sought to strengthen
GATT's relationship with other international organizations re-
sponsible for monetary and financial matters, so as to achieve
greater coherence in economic policy-making on a global level. 31
Nothing specific was said at the 1986 Punta del Este Minis-
terial Meeting about developing a new organizational structure.
The FOGS negotiating group concentrated on developing a trade
policy review mechanism, achieving a greater ministerial in-
volvement in GATT, and finding ways for the GATT to contrib-
ute more to the achievement of greater coherence in global
economic policy, especially by cooperating with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In the FOGS report
to the December 1988-April 1989 "Mid-Term Review," no men-
tion was made of any discussion of a possible Multilateral Trade
Organization (MTO), although it was agreed that the group
should "continue to explore other means by which to improve the
overall effectiveness and decision-making of the GATT."32
Work was proceeding, however, on the organizational and
constitutional questions in various other places. The Royal In-
stitute of International Affairs sponsored a detailed study by
Professor John Jackson which spelled out many of the institu-
tional and legal short comings and defects of GATT. This study,
which was to become a seminal work, argued for the establish-
ment of a World Trade Organization (WTO).3 3 This proposed
WTO would not contain many substantive obligations, but
would take the form of an umbrella institution with a firm con-
stitutional basis. The WTO would administer and service GATT
and the relevant codes, agreements, and understandings. 34 Ear-
lier, in 1983, Camps and Diebold, in a study sponsored by the
Council on Foreign Relations, had also made a case for changes
in the organizational structure of the GATT. 35
In the spring of 1990 the European Community (EC), draw-
ing heavily on Jackson's study, tabled before the GATT some
30. Id. part I(E)(ii).
31. Id. part I(EXiii).
32. News of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations [herein-
after NUR] 046, GATT (Mar. 4, 1991).
33. JACKSON, supra note 22, at 91-103.
34. Id. Both existing and future GATT agreements and codes would be ad-
ministered by the proposed WTO. Id.
35. MImIAM CAMPS & WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR., THE NEW MuLTILATERALIsM:
CAN TiE WORLD SYSTEM BE SAVED? (1983). See also MIIAM CAMPs, THE CASE
FOR A NEW GLOBAL TRADE ORGANmZATION (1980).
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ideas on the establishment of a multilateral trade organization
(MTO). The EC noted the priority that must be given in the ne-
gotiations to the substantive issues, but expressed the hope at
the December 1990 Ministerial meeting (then scheduled to "con-
clude" the Uruguay Round) that the ministers could agree in
principle to establish such an organization, to be followed by de-
tailed negotiations on the MTO's content. Noting the fragmen-
tation of the GATT system with the proliferation of side-codes,
to be further complicated by an agreement on services, this com-
munication stressed three specific needs. The first need was to
establish the legal basis for ensuring the effective implementa-
tion of the results of the Uruguay Round, in particular that the
new dispute settlement procedures would be applicable to each
of the separate agreements. The second need was to provide a
proper institutional framework for the Secretariat. The third
need was to provide the institutional basis for cooperation with
other international organizations to the end of ensuring greater
coherence in global economic policy-making.36 This MTO was to
be a purely organizational convention without substantive pro-
visions, which would serve as an umbrella for the administra-
tion of the GATT and its side agreements.
At about the same time, Canada put forward a similar pro-
posal. It stressed the need to strengthen the institutional
framework of the GAT as a means of blunting the pressure for
regional arrangements and unilateral action. The Swiss also
put forward some ideas, emphasizing the need to strengthen the
GATT Secretariat, especially its independent analytical capac-
ity. The United States stepped in a few months later and
presented a proposal in October 1990 calling for the establish-
ment of a GATT Management Board to improve the effective-
ness of the decision-making capabilities of the GATT with wide
but unspecified functions. The proposal authorized the Board to
develop a plan for a successor organization to the GATT.
The draft documents prepared for the ill-fated December
1990 Brussels meeting included no specific proposals on institu-
tional reform of the GATT. There was a section entitled "Insti-
tutional Reinforcement of the GATT," but it simply referred to
an April 1989 "Decision" that the cps should meet at Ministerial
36. See International Chamber of Commerce, Commission on International
Trade Policy, Doc No.103/INT 61, Sept. 1991, reproducing a report by the
UNCTAD. Over the years the U.N. and especially the UNCTAD have put for-
ward many proposals for strengthening international organizations in the area
of trade, but space does not permit us to summarize them here.
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level at least once every two years in order, inter alia, "to make a
further contribution to the direction and content of GATT
work."37 It also noted that the results of the Uruguay Round
would "substantially enlarge the scope of further cooperation"
and would require appropriate adoption of existing consultative
and institutional arrangements. 38 Annex IV of the draft docu-
ments was titled "Basic Elements of an Organizational Agree-
ment," but it was literally a blank page. It was apparent that a
number of institutional issues remained to be settled but the
question of what, if anything, should be done to create a new
organizational structure was put on the back burner for a while.
The task of reaching agreement on several difficult and out-
standing substantive issues was taxing enough without the
drain of energy and attention surely to occur if broader organi-
zational and structural questions were considered. 39
Importantly, in April 1991, a new negotiating structure for
the whole Uruguay Round was established and one of six groups
was labeled "Institutions." It took over the work of the FOGS
group and the dispute settlement group and assumed the task of
drafting a Final Act.40 As the Director-General later stated in
November 1991, the task of the Institutional Group was to de-
velop the institutional support necessary for implementing the
results of the substantive negotiations: "A very well coordinated
approach is essential in respect of the infrastructure that will be
put in place to fulfill the requirements of notification, monitor-
ing, surveillance, and dispute settlement arising from a large
number of Uruguay Round agreements."41
III. DUNKEL DRAFT MTO PROPOSAL
Following further extensive negotiations among the mem-
bers and discussions with them and the chairmen of the various
negotiating groups, the Director-General of GATT, Arthur
Dunkel, on December 20, 1991, tabled a 436 page document en-
titled "Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
37. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations, GATTF Doc. MTN.TNCJW/35 (Nov. 26, 1990) at 322.
This draft was known as the "Brussels Draft."
38. Id. at 323-24.
39. For a summary of Uruguay Round negotiations during that time pe-
riod, see NUR 046, GATT (March 4, 1991).
40. See NUR 047, GATT (April 29, 1991).
41. NUR 050, GATT, at 7 (Nov. 11, 1991).
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Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,"42 often referred to as
the "Dunkel Draft." The press reported that "the vast bulk of
the text - upwards of 85 per cent -was negotiated and agreed."43
Nonetheless, it was not a consensus document. Key texts had
been put together as compromise positions by Dunkel's staff.44
In addition to all of the substantive provisions,45 the Dunkel
Draft included three major institutional undertakings: a com-
prehensive reform of the dispute settlement procedures, a trade
policy review mechanism, and the text of an Agreement Estab-
lishing the Multilateral Trade Organization. 46 The following
sections consider in detail the text of the draft Agreement Estab-
lishing the Multilateral Trade Organization.
A. COMMON INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The MTO document established a common institutional
framework for all the agreements annexed to it. These annexed
agreements include GATT, as modified by the Uruguay Round,
and its associated instruments, except the Protocol of Provi-
sional Application;47 all existing agreements and arrangements
previously concluded under GATT auspices; and the complete
results of the Uruguay Round.48 The old GATT would lapse.
The MTO would have legal personality. The MTO was intended
to ensure a "single undertaking approach"49 - it was to be all or
42. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991) [here-
inafter Dunkel Draft].
43. Frances Williams, Dunkel Goes For Final GAT Sprint, FIN. TIMEs,
Jan. 13, 1992, at 4.
44. PATRICK Low, TRADING FREE: THE GATT AND U.S. TRADE POLICY
(1993).
45. The substantive provisions of the Dunkel Draft included: Agriculture,
Subsidies, Anti-dumping, Textiles, Safeguards, and Trade in Services.
46. Dunkel Draft, supra note 42, at 91-101 (Annex IV)[hereinafter MTO].
47. While this Protocol would not be included in the MTO, existing grand-
father rights would be preserved. Footnote 1 to the draft MTO text provides
that "[tihe provisions of the MTO Agreement are without prejudice to the sub-
stantive results of the Uruguay Round as it affects the existing rights of con-
tracting parties under paragraph 1(b) of the Protocol of Provisional Application
and under equivalent provisions of the Protocols of Accession." Id. art. II n.1.
48. These documents were all attached as Annexes to the MTO Agreement.
Id. Annexes 1-4.
49. "The MTO framework would serve as a vehicle to ensure a 'single un-
dertaking approach' to the results of the Uruguay Round - thus membership in
the MTO would automatically entail taking on all the results of the Round
without exception." NUR 055, GATT (Dec 3, 1991).
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nothing., o This critical aspect would solve the "free rider" prob-
lem noted earlier.5l The only exception in the coverage, except
for the provisions on "non-application" noted below, was that
governments could join the MTO without being signatories to
four of the Tokyo Round agreements.5 2
B. FUNCTIONS OF THE MTO
The functions of the MTO as set out in Article III of the
Dunkel Text were to facilitate the administration and the opera-
tion of the entire enterprise.5 3 The MTO was also intended to
provide the framework for the implementation of all the agree-
ments that had been or might be negotiated under the auspices
of the Agreement and to provide the forum for future trade nego-
tiations. In addition, the MTO would administer the Integrated
GATT Dispute Settlement System and the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism, and cooperate with the IMF and the World Bank in
achieving greater coherence in global economic policy making.5 4
There were no provisions for formal or legal ties to the
United Nations.55 In brief recognition of the great interest of
various environmental groups in trade, Article IV provided that
the MTO could make, as appropriate, suitable arrangements
with non-governmental organizations "concerned with matters
within the scope of the MTO."5 6
C. STRUCTURE OF THE MTO
The MTO would be headed by a Ministerial Council5 7 (open
to all members) meeting at least once every two years.58 This
50. Article II of the MTO states that the annexed Agreements "shall have
all members as parties." MTO, supra note 46, art. II(1).
51. See text accompanying notes 21-22. r
52. The excepted agreements are: the Agreement on Trade in Civil Air-
craft; the Agreement on Government Procurement; the International Dairy Ar-
rangement; and the Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat. MTO, supra note
46, Annexes 1 & 4.
53. Id. art. III.
54. Id.
55. The GATT has no formal relationship to the United Nations. It is
treated as a specialized agency on a de facto basis. The most important tie to
the United Nations is the participation of members of the Secretariat in the
United Nations' pension and insurance schemes. GATT art. XXVI specifies
that the GATT shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions and that body is authorized to effect registration of the General Agree-
ment. GAT art. XXVI.
56. MTO, supra note 46, art. IV.
57. Id. art. V.
58. Id. art. V(1).
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was meant to replace the present practice of an annual "high
level" meeting of the cps. A General Council, open to all mem-
bers, would be established to meet regularly to supervise the op-
eration of the MTO and the annexed agreements5 9 between
Ministerial Council meetings.60 This Council would replace the
present GATT Council. Under the Council would be three sub-
sidiary councils: a Goods Council, 61 a Services Council,62 and a
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
Council.6 3 These bodies would oversee the operation of agree-
ments in their respective sectors. In addition, two new "Bodies"
would be created: a Dispute Settlement Body and a Trade Policy
Review Mechanism."4
The General Council, which would establish its own rules
and procedures, would also set up the following committees:
Budget, Finance and Administration, Trade and Development,
and Balance of Payments.65 A Secretariat was to be established,
with its functions and responsibilities to be approved by the
General Council.66
D. JoNT ACTION AND VOTING
A critical aspect of the proposal was that at meetings of the
Ministerial Conference and General Council, that is, for joint ac-
tion by the cps, each member was entitled to one vote.67 Gener-
ally, decisions were to be taken by a majority of votes cast, except
that for a waiver of obligations a two-thirds majority of the votes
cast was required, with such majority comprising more than half
the members.68 These provisions parallel the original GATT Ar-
ticle XXV. GAT Article XXV, however, was drafted when the
membership was much smaller and there were few small devel-
oping country members. Also, as noted above, (except for acces-
sions and waivers) GATT has not proceeded to a formal vote in
reaching decisions for many years. Rather, it has taken deci-
sions by consensus.
59. Id. art. V(2).
60. Id.
61. Id. arts. V(3), V(4), and V(5).
62. Id. arts. V(3), V(4), and V(6).
63. Id. arts. V(3), V(4), and V(7).
64. Id. art. V(3).
65. Id. art. V(3). Comparable bodies currently exist under GATR.
66. Id. art. VI.
67. Id. art. IX(l).
68. Id. art. IX(3).
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It was provided in the MTO draft that the Ministerial Con-
ference and the General Council, operating under the majority
rule, "shall have the authority to interpret the provisions" of all
the attached agreements. 69 No such explicit interpretation pro-
vision is included in GATT and the practices to date have been
varied and complex, including rulings by the Chairman of the
cps, reports of Panels and Working Parties, and Council
action.70
E. NON-APPLICATION AND AMENDMENTS
With respect to amendments and modifications of the
Agreements, Article X of the MTO Draft specified that such ne-
gotiations "shall be concluded by the Ministerial Conference on
the basis of consensus" 71 and that they would "become effective
for each member, upon acceptance by two-thirds of the mem-
bers."72 This is an important change from GATT Article XXX
which provides that amendments become effective in respect of
those countries which accept them upon acceptance by two-thirds
of the cps and thereafter for each contracting party upon accept-
ance by it.7 3 Both the MTO draft and GATT Article XXX provide
that the Ministerial Conference (cps in the case of GATT) may
decide that any member not accepting an amendment is free to
withdraw or can remain a member with the consent of the Min-
isterial Conference (or cps under GATT). 74
The provisions on Accession, 75 Non-Application between
Particular Members, 76 Acceptance, 77 and Withdrawal 78 again
69. Id. art. IX(2).
70. See JACKSON, supra note 4, at 17-26. Because international rules are
frequently drafted in vague terms as the price for securing agreement of multi-
ple parties, subsequent interpretations can prove decisive. As a result, parties
find it difficult to agree on the locus of power of interpretation. GATTs failure
to explicitly address the issue is a recognition of this difficulty. With the expan-
sion of the rules of international trade under the Uruguay Round the important
role of interpretations became so significant that an explicit provision became
necessary. Necessary as a provision is, making rulings by a majority vote bind-
ing even on those who disagree has proven extremely controversial. As dis-
cussed infra text accompanying notes 110-17, the United States has insisted
that interpretations be by consensus. We agree. See infra part V.
71. MTO, supra note 46, art. X(1).
72. Id. art. X(2) (emphasis added).
73. GATT art. XXX.
74. MTO, supra note 46, art. X(3). GATT art. XXX.
75. MTO, supra note 46, art. XII.
76. Id. art. XIII.
77. Id. art. XIV.
78. Id. art. XV.
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parallel those in GATT. But, as discussed below, this time the
non-application provisions create very serious problems by jeop-
ardizing the "single undertaking" approach.
The section on Final Provisions states that no reservations
can be entered in respect of any provision in the agreements in
Annex 1 and that the members "shall endeavour to take all nec-
essary steps... to ensure the conformity of their laws with [the
annexed] Agreements." 79
Even though the document represented the results of exten-
sive negotiations among the cps, many concerns were swept
aside by the drafters and, as noted above, it was not a consensus
document. Moreover, the national delegates who worked with
the Secretariat in drafting the MTO were often relatively junior
officials and not as sensitive to some of the political implications
as their seniors would prove to be.8 0 It was recognized that fur-
ther elaboration of the text would be required, and a special
working group was set up in December 1991 to try to resolve the
contentious issues.8 ' Meanwhile, the reactions of interested
parties around the world ranged from serious objection to cau-
tious approval.
IV. REACTIONS
A. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Professor Robert E. Hudec drew attention to what some
thought would be a serious problem for developing countries
when he noted that a legal instrument combining the results of
the U"uguay Round with all existing GATT legal obligations in
one package meant that governments would have to decide
whether to accept everything or leave GATT.8 2 "In essence, this
new approach completely restructures the developed-developing
country bargain, proposing to pay for all the new developing
country concessions [in the Uruguay Round] simply by agreeing
not to destroy the market access they already have."8 3 One can,
of course, easily imagine some of those looking out for the inter-
ests of developed countries responding to this concern by saying,
"it's about time they paid for their free rides of the past."84
79. Id. art. XVI.
80. Interview with observer who spoke on condition of non-attribution.
81. NUR 055, GATT, at 1 (Dec. 3, 1992).
82. Robert E. Hudec, GATT and the Developing Countries, 1992 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 67, 76.
83. Id.
84. U.S. negotiator who spoke on condition of non-attribution.
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Some developing countries, even before the release of the
Dunkel Draft, were reported to favor placing the entire enter-
prise within the United Nations system.8 5 Presumably they be-
lieved their concerns would receive more sympathetic treatment
there. This proposal, apparently, has not been seriously pur-
sued and we have found no documentary evidence of the specific
problems the developing countries have found in the MTO pro-
posal. Nor have we found any evidence that these countries
were attempting to block acceptance of the MTO or to negotiate
major changes in the Dunkel Draft.
B. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
The most outspoken opponents of the MTO are the con-
sumer and environmental Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs). 8 6 The essence of their opposition is that the MTO will
increase the power and effectiveness of international trade rules
and in so doing will infringe on the ability of national govern-
ments to control their domestic policy and legislation. As stated
by one group: the MTO "means enhanced enforcement of bad
procedural and substantive rules" 7 which reduces national sov-
ereignty, undermines national policies and the ability of nations
to protect the environment and consumers, weakens domestic
laws, and does so with little or no accountability. 8
In our view, while the NGOs have focused their opposition
on the MTO, their real target is the entire Dunkel Draft and its
goal of liberalizing trade through the implementation of enforce-
able substantive international rules. As the unifying structure,
the MTO offers a convenient, and not totally illogical, target.
Although their concerns regarding the impact on domestic laws
are overblown and more properly addressed to the agreement on
dispute settlement, they do have certain merit. The new systen
will increase pressure on nations to conform their domestic laws
to the international rules to which they have agreed. Many
85. William Dullforce, Leading Developing Countries Urge UN World
Trade Body, FIN. TmIEs, Oct. 2, 1990, at 8.
86. Certain individual members of the U.S. Congress have also strongly
criticized the MTO. Rep. Jill Long (D-Ind.) has been particularly outspoken.
Among other actions, she requested a Congressional Research study of the im-
pact of the MTO on domestic U.S. laws. The study, dated March 18, 1992, was
prepared by the American Law Division.
87. PuBIuc CITIZEN, INC., WHY VOTERS ARE CONCERNED: ENvmoNmNTAL
AND CONSUMER PROBLEMS IN GATT AND NAFTA, BRIEFING BOOK FOR THE 103RD
CONGRESS 37 (1993).
88. Id. ch. 8.
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would find this increased pressure for compliance to be a plus,
rather than a cause for concern.
The views of NGOs regarding the power of the MTO to im-
pose rules which override domestic policies is again exaggerated
but not totally unfounded. The decision-making within the
MTO, which is nothing more than the sum of its member nations
and not an independent entity as the NGOs imply, does allow for
the possibility that nations will be bound by obligations to which
they did not agree. This aspect of the MTO was also opposed by
the United States.8 9
While the NGOs generally fail to identify the particular of-
fending provisions of the Dunkel text, key among their concerns
is that the MTO will force nations to change their domestic laws,
presumably in ways that will adversely affect their particular
interests. Three aspects of the MTO agreement are relevant to
this issue. Those aspects are the role of the MTO in grandfather
rights, specific obligations regarding domestic law changes, and
dispute settlement.
1. Grandfather Rights
Outside the context of dispute settlement, the MTO is not
designed to enforce conformity of all domestic laws with the an-
nexed Agreements. The MTO specifically allows countries to
maintain inconsistent laws for which they have previously
claimed grandfather rights and which were not affected by the
Uruguay Round. Although the GATT Protocol of Provisional
Application, of which grandfather rights is a part, is specifically
excluded from the scope of the MTO,90 a recurrent footnote pre-
serves existing grandfather rights.91
Regarding non-grandfathered laws that are inconsistent
with the Agreement, the MTO requires only that countries at-
tempt to achieve conformity. Article XVI(4) provides that, "[t]he
Members shall endeavour to take all necessary steps, where
changes to domestic laws will be required to implement the pro-
visions of the agreements annexed hereto, to ensure the con-
formity of their laws with these Agreements."92 Use of the word
"endeavour" clearly indicates that countries are not required to
change their non-conforming laws. The MTO obligation to make
a good-faith effort to conform to the obligations to which a coun-
89. U.S. negotiator who spoke on condition of non-attribution.
90. MTO, supra note 46, art. 11(1).
91. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
92. MTO, supra note 46, art. XVI(4).
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try has agreed is no different than that which exists under the
current GATT.
2. Impose Rules Not Agreed To
A second major worry of the NGOs is that the MTO will not
only force member countries to change their domestic laws to
conform to the international rules to which they have agreed,
but that it will also impose on them international rules and poli-
cies with which they do not necessarily agree. 93
Again, the claims are exaggerated but not totally without
basis. Although when nations join the Agreements they do so
knowingly and voluntarily, the obligations to which they are
thereby subjected may be changed by subsequent actions of the
MTO. 94 The most important such actions for present purposes
are amendment of the Agreements, interpretation of the Agree-
ments and waivers of obligations imposed by the Agreements.
The most direct and explicit means for altering obligations
is by amendment. As more fully discussed below, under the
MTO, amendments become binding on all parties when imple-
mented into domestic law by two-thirds of the members. 95
Thus, nations may find themselves bound by provisions with
which they do not agree, unless they withdraw altogether or are
given an exception by the Ministerial Conference.96
A less direct, but potentially as effective, way to alter obliga-
tions is through interpretation. This is particularly true with
international obligations where the price for widespread accept-
ance is often vagueness. Interpretation of the Agreements is de-
cided by a majority of votes cast, with each member having one
vote.97 Thus, nations in the minority effectively will find them-
selves subject to obligations to which they never agreed. 98
To reduce the risk of this happening, the MTO provides that
an obligation (whether or not the subject of a formal interpreta-
tion) may be waived for a member if such waiver is approved by
two-thirds of the votes cast and such two-thirds comprises more
than half the MTO members.99 However, while this waiver may
93. Official of an NGO who spoke on condition of non-attribution.
94. It must be kept in mind that actions by dispute settlement panels are
not actions of the MTO.
95. MTO, supra note 46, art. X(2).
96. Id. art. X(3).
97. Id. art. IX(1), (2).
98. This would not be likely to occur in the current GATT where decisions
are taken by consensus.
99. MTO, supra note 46, art. IX(3).
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address the concerns of those opposed to the interpretation, it is
not without significance for those remaining under its terms.
The actual impact of an international economic obligation de-
pends on who undertakes it. Thus, opponents of the waiver will
find themselves subject to an obligation with a different impact
than that to which they agreed.
3. Dispute Settlement
One of the MTO's major functions is to administer the dis-
pute settlement system. 100 As such, it is a convenient target for
objections more properly directed at the Dunkel draft agreement
on the dispute settlement mechanism.' 0 '
Even if misdirected, are the concerns about the proposed
dispute settlement provisions justified? To a certain extent, yes.
The Dunkel Text on dispute settlement would certainly
strengthen enforcement of GATT rules. It provides for a strict
time schedule, the automatic establishment of panels, confiden-
tial proceedings, automatic adoption of panel reports, strict sur-
veillance of implementation, near-automatic authorization of
retaliation, and a process for appeal.' 0 2 These changes would
greatly improve the efficiency of the system and, most impor-
tantly, increase the pressure on losing parties whose laws are
found to violate the GATT to conform. No longer could a losing
party block the adoption of an unfavorable report, nor assume
that there would be no economic cost for noncompliance. How-
ever, the new right of appeal provides a valuable protection
against arbitrary political decisions and thereby eliminates
much of the justification and need for noncompliance and block-
ing of reports. Still, nations would not be forced to change their
laws. A losing nation would have, as it does presently, the op-
tion of not conforming; it would simply be more likely to pay a
price. Moreover, in the United States, dispute settlement panel
rulings would not be self-executing. Any changes in U.S. laws
necessary to comply would generally require an act of Congress
to implement.
Some members of the U.S. Congress and U.S.-based NGOs
are particularly concerned that the United States will be forced
100. Id. art. I(4).
101. Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes under Articles XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Dunkel Draft, supra note 42, at S.1.
102. MTO, supra note 46, art. V(3).
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to abandon section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.103 This fear
was given credence by the EC, whose early support of the MTO
was in part based on its belief that the MTO would do away with
section 301.104 It is, however, exaggerated. Much of section 301
is totally GATT-consistent. 10 5 Furthermore, nothing in the
Dunkel Draft dispute settlement provisions would prohibit the
United States from continuing to use section 301 in a GATT-
inconsistent manner. The United States would simply be more
likely to be required to pay for doing so. Moreover, the new pro-
cedures reduce the need for section 301, which was instituted in
large part as a result of the dissatisfaction with the ability of
GATT to resolve disputes effectively and expeditiously.10 6
C. THE U.S. POSITION
The United States was the only negotiating country to ex-
press strong opposition to the Dunkel Draft MTO and to advo-
cate that it be dropped from the Uruguay Round final package.
The EC and Canada, the two other major players in the MTO
debate, perceived many of the same problems as did the United
States.10 7 In contrast to the United States, however, they con-
sidered the MTO to be critical to the success of the Uruguay
Round and thought that the problems could be resolved through
negotiated changes.
The United States supported the stated objectives of the
MTO, but believed that as drafted, it did not adequately accom-
103. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. III, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)). Section 301 is the mechanism
by which the United States responds, generally by imposing prohibitive duties
on imports from the concerned country, to foreign countries' "unfair" trade prac-
tices which burden U.S. commerce. As such it is a valued tool for members of
Congress concerned with the protection of their constituents' interests. For
similar reasons it is perhaps the U.S. trade law most disliked by U.S. trading
partners who are its target.
See generally Judith D. Bello and Alan F. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and
Policy Series No. 21: GATT Dispute Settlement Agreement: Internationalization
or Elimination of Section 301?, 26 IN'r'L L. 795 (1992) (discussing interaction of
section 301 and GATTr).
104. U.S. negotiators who spoke on condition of non-attribution.
105. Section 301 is GATT consistent when it is used in conjunction with
GATT dispute settlement against practices determined by GATT panels to be
GATT illegal or against practices not covered by the GATT.
106. An important component of the Uruguay Round is the negotiation of
rules on dispute settlement. Key among the weaknesses of the current GATT
rules are the absence of deadlines, the opportunities for parties to stall, and the
ability of parties to prevent a final binding ruling from being issued.
107. EC and Canadian officials, each of whom spoke on condition of non-
attribution.
1994]
MiA. J GLOBAL TRADE
plish them. Moreover, an unintended, but substantial, cost of
the MTO was that it provided a target on which opponents of
trade liberalization could focus their opposition without seeming
to oppose the entire round.'08 The U.S. concerns focused on vot-
ing rules and the provisions on non-application and future
negotiations. 109
1. Voting Rules and Procedures
A major U.S. concern was that the rules on voting would
permit actions having an effect on the rights and obligations of
the United States to be taken without U.S. consent. Three areas
present concerns regarding voting procedures: decision making
or joint action, interpretation, and amendments.
As noted earlier, Article IX (1) of the MTO draft concerning
"Joint Action" provides that decisions of the Ministerial Confer-
ence or the General Council will be by a majority vote, with each
member nation having one vote. 110 In order to ensure that it
would never be outvoted, the United States suggested providing
for weighted voting based on factors that would guarantee this
result. Such a system, while favored by the EC, was strongly
opposed by the developing countries."'
The second paragraph of Article IX provides that interpreta-
tions of the Agreements shall be made by a similar majority
vote.112 Because of the important role interpretations play in
determining the impact of the Agreements on members, the
United States insisted that interpretations be adopted by
consensus.
113
Article X of the MTO draft provides for a two step process
for amending the Agreements. Amendments must first be
agreed to by a consensus of the members in the Ministerial Con-
ference. 114 It must next be accepted domestically by two-thirds
of the member governments, at which point it becomes binding
on all members, even non-accepting members. 115 Non-accepting
108. U.S. Uruguay Round Coordinator, Ambassador designate, John
Schmidt, Statement to National Foreign Trade Council (Aug. 5, 1993).
109. U.S. negotiator who spoke on condition of non-attribution.
110. Despite the provision in GATT art. XXV calling for majority rule, since
1959 all joint actions have been by consensus. See supra text accompanying
notes 12-13.
111. U.S. negotiator who spoke on condition of non-attribution.
112. MTO, supra note 46, art. IX(2).
113. U.S. negotiator who spoke on condition of non-attribution.
114. MTO, supra note 46, art. X(1).
115. Id. art. X(2).
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members may, in circumstances determined by a majority of the
members to so justify, withdraw from the MTO, or remain a
member with the consent of the Ministerial Conference." 6 The
United States did not object to amendments becoming binding
upon acceptance by two-thirds of the member governments, but
insisted that they be binding only on those that accept them."17
In addition to concerns regarding voting procedures, the
United States had concerns with the provisions on non-applica-
tion, and future negotiations on trade and the environment. 118
2. Non-Application
The Dunkel Draft MTO provisions on non-application are
not clear, but can be interpreted to effectively allow countries to
pick and choose among the Agreements. 119 This would totally
negate the idea of a single undertaking designed to avoid the
free rider problem and which was the primary reason that the
United States originally supported the concept of an MTO. 120
The U.S. position was that countries should be allowed to invoke
non-application only in respect of all the annexed agreements,
preserving the all-or-nothing, single undertaking concept. 121
3. Environmental and Waiver Concerns
A less important concern of the United States was that the
Dunkel Draft MTO text provided insufficient reference to trade
and the environment.122 The United States wanted reference to
116. Id. art. X(3). With the exception of MFN and tariff schedules, amend-
ments become binding on cps who accept them, upon acceptance by two-thirds
of the cps. GATT art. XXX.
117. U.S. negotiator who spoke on condition of non-attribution.
118. U.S. negotiator who spoke on condition of non-attribution.
119. The text of MTO Article XIII(1) is not clear as to whether countries will
be permitted to invoke non-application vis-a-vis individual agreements or
whether a non-application must apply to the entire group of agreements in each
of the three core groups of agreements set forth in Annexes A, 1B, and 1C.
MTO, supra note 46, art. XIII(1).
120. U.S. negotiator who spoke on condition of non-attribution.
121. The MTO text reaffirms that the MTO was intended to serve as the
basis for a single undertaking. The Preamble notes among the purposes of the
MTO the development of an "integrated" trading system. MTO, supra note 46,
pmbl. The provisions on the scope of the MTO note that MTO members shall be
parties to all the annexed agreements. Id. art. II.
122. Letter from Ambassador Michael Kantor to Rep. Jill Long (D-Ind.)
(June 21, 1993) (on file with the authors) [hereinafter Kantor Letter]. This par-
ticular concern was raised to placate the domestic environmental movement
and its congressional allies in the hopes of gaining their support for the Uru-
guay Round. Administration officials who spoke on condition of non-
attribution.
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be made to the need to ensure sustainable development and to
provide specifically for further negotiations on trade and the en-
vironment.123 The United States viewed as inadequate the pro-
vision in Article I(3) for future negotiations concerning trade
relations which reads, "as may be decided by the Ministerial
Conference." 124 While no country has opposed the idea of future
negotiations on trade and the environment, explicit reference to
any specific negotiation was apparently avoided due to the diffi-
culty of agreeing on which topics would be cited. The United
States also considered that the statement in the preamble recog-
nizing that trade "should be conducted with a view to... devel-
oping the optimal use of the resources of the world at
sustainable levels"125 incorrectly implies that the goal is to de-
velop and use resources, rather than to promote sustainable
development.126
Finally, although there is some ambiguity on the issue, the
United States apparently opposed the creation of a general
waiver authority in the Ministerial Conference or General Coun-
cil which would apply to all the Agreements. 127 The United
States preferred instead that decisions on waivers be governed
by procedures established in each individual agreement or each
of the three core groups of Agreements set forth in sub-Annexes
1A,1B and 1C.
4. An Alternative U.S. Proposal
Arguing that it was unable to negotiate satisfactory amend-
ments to the Dunkel MTO text, the United States proposed an
alternative to achieve the objectives of the MTO without creat-
ing the problems discussed above. 128 This draft "Decision and
Protocol"129 would establish a structure similar to that of the
MTO but one which would not create an organization with an
independent legal standing. The proposal addressed the various
concerns of the United States to the MTO as follows.
Decision-making by the Ministerial Trade Committee, a
body analogous to the MTO's Ministerial Conference, generally
123. U.S. negotiator who spoke on condition of non-attribution.
124. MTO, supra note 46, art. I(3).
125. Id. pmbl.
126. U.S. negotiator who spoke on condition of non-attribution.
127. MTO, supra note 46, art. IX(3).
128. U.S. negotiator who spoke on condition of non-attribution.
129. The text of "Decisions and Protocol" is contained in the Kantor Letter.
See supra note 122.
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would be by consensus. 130 No mention is made of amendment,
interpretation or waivers, implying that these specific decisions
would also be by consensus. Accession by new members, how-
ever, would be provided by a two-thirds majority vote. 131
The protocol attempted to ensure all or nothing participa-
tion in three ways. First, it contained a preambulary resolution
to develop an "integrated" multilateral trading system encom-
passing GATT, former rounds and "all of the results of the Uru-
guay Round." 132 Second, it provided that acceptance of the
Protocol constitutes acceptance of all of the Agreements. 133
Third, it allowed for withdrawal from all, but not just some, of
the Agreements.134
Importance was accorded to environmental protection and
sustainable development by a statement in the preamble that
the negotiated trade liberalization should be "consistent with
environmental protection and conservation" and "contribute to
the promotion of sustainable development."135 Interestingly, no
specific reference was made to trade and the environment as a
subject of future negotiations. Furthermore, despite the de-
mands of the environmental movement, the U.S. proposal
adopted an organizational structure with a "Committee" rather
than a higher level "Council" on trade and the environment. 136
The U.S. proposal remained on the table along with the
draft MTO text, but as of winter 1993 had not received the sup-
port of any other delegation. 137
V. CONCLUSION
Provided agreement is finally reached on the substantive is-
sues of the Uruguay Round,'13 the case for a new organizational/
institutional structure with a definitive legal basis is compel-
ling. In addition, the general outline of the draft MTO - objec-
tives, scope, function, and structure - strike us as well designed
and responsive to demonstrated needs. There are, however,
three major areas where changes are desirable - probably even
130. Kantor Letter, supra note 122, at Protocol, 8.
131. Id. Protocol 3.
132. Id. at Decision, pmbl.
133. Id. at Protocol T 1.
134. Id. at Protocol T 13.
135. Id. at Decision, pmbl. (emphasis added).
136. Id. at Protocol I 5(dXiv).
137. Kantor Letter, supra note 122.
138. The Uruguay Round was completed on December 15, 1993.
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necessary - if a successful agreement on an MTO is to be
reached.
The most important has to do with decision-making by the
members acting as a group. A system of one member, one vote
and majority rules, or some variation thereof, apparently is sim-
ply not acceptable to some of the members whose participation is
essential, including the United States and the EC. A system of
formal weighted voting would require a major negotiation in it-
self and it is difficult to imagine a solution that would be accept-
able to both the giants and the smaller members. We conclude
that the appropriate solution would be to codify and continue
the practice followed by the GATT cps since 1959 and take joint-
action decisions by consensus, except where different procedures
have been agreed to in the individual Uruguay Round agree-
ments. This system has been tested in a wide variety of situa-
tions, is familiar to all the members, and has worked
remarkably well for over three decades. We know of no convinc-
ing reason why it should not be extended to accession decisions
and the granting of waivers which are currently subject to a for-
mal voting procedure.
The second needed change in the draft is for a clear provi-
sion that future negotiations will deal with the issues of trade
and the environment. A reading of GATT discussions and de-
bates for the past several years shows that the members have
already committed themselves to this. 139 Indeed, one often sees
reference to the next round of multilateral trade negotiations as
the "Green Round." It would, however, in our view, be a great
mistake to attempt to spell out in the MTO document either the
aims or the specific subject matter of such negotiations. That is
a task that will take many months, and to attempt to deal with
it now could well doom the whole Uruguay Round. Those are
matters for the negotiations of the terms of the mandate for the
next round.
Finally, the provisions in the MTO draft on non-application
must make unequivocally clear that the MTO is a "single-under-
taking," that it is all or nothing participation, and that a mem-
ber does not have the option of picking and choosing among the
139. See e.g., GATT to Focus on Trade and Environment Link, GATr Focus,
(Oct. 1991); Arthur Dunkel Calls On Governments To Develop Constructive
Links Between Trade And Environmental Policy-Making. GATT Doc. GATIY
1527, (Jan. 23, 1992); Expanding Trade Can Help Solve Environmental
Problems, Says Report. GAWT Doc. GA 1T/1529, (Feb. 3, 1992); Expanding
Trade Can Help Solve Environmental Problems, Says Report, GATr Focus,
(Mar. 1992).
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various annexed agreements, or among the various groups of an-
nexed agreements. Members should be given only the chance, at
the time they join the MTO, to notify the General Council that
they will not apply any of the annexed Agreements to another
member. Without provisions such as these, a successful agree-
ment on an MTO will not be reached.

